II. INTRODUCTION
Corruption has become a way of life for government officials in Russia.' Bribe-taking, in fact, is a widespread practice throughout the Russian bureaucracy.' A number of U.S. and other Western businesses and businessmen routinely pay bribes to Russian government officials in order to conduct their businesses in Russia. 3 Indeed, the most prevalent crime in Russia today is bribery. 4 Of those charged with bribery and corruption in Russia in 1993, over forty-two percent were government officials 5 and over twenty-five percent were law enforcement officers. 6 Not only do Russian officials routinely accept and even demand bribes, 7 they have also entered into an illicit partnership with organized crime and with clandestine business groups.' Former Communist apparachiks, who continue to work within the Russian bureaucracy, exploit previously made blackmarketeer relationships to profit in the new post-Revolutionary Russian system. 9 Thus, a partnership formed long before the attempted coup of 1991 by organized crime and Communist government officials now threatens the growth of democracy in Russia. 1 0 parts, they are often, indeed always, requested to pay government officials for the latters' acquiescence in the deal. These officials represent a wide range, from low-level bureaucrats to high-ranking Russian government employees.
3. See Von Der Heydt, Russia's Spiritual Wilderness, 70 POL'Y REv. 12 (1994).
To Whom Belongs Power in Russia? Ministry of Thieves-in-Law: An Attempt at Break-
ing into Politics, IzvErsTIA, July 20, 1994, at 1, 5 [hereinafter lzvr.sTIA.
5. George Nikides, Journalists Hit TV Mafiya, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at 10. While virtually all activities were controlled by the Government in the former Soviet Union, there are now a large number of government officials working in what is now the private sector. Id. As the Author notes:
[C]orruption in advertising on [Russian] state television began seven years ago, when executives first debated the cost of a minute of air time. They came up with a figure of 2,000 rubles a minute, a price so low it invited executives to demand additional payment, or bribe, of 10,000 rubles before an ad would go on the air. Id. On November 7, 1994, the exchange rate was approximately 3200 Rubles for one U.S. dollar. Id. 6. Id. 7. Leonid Zhukhevitsky, Crash Course for International Businessmen, Part II, THE RusstAN, June 1995, at 66.
To Whom Belongs Power in Russia?
, supra note 4, at 1, 5. According to Russian police sources, there has been a gradual alliance formed between Mafiya organizations, Russian government bureaucrats, and legitimate and illegitimate businessmen. As a result of this alliance, 70% of the privatization auctions were shams where the buyer was selected well in advance. Money Talks, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1994, at 10. Corruption "risks causing political unrest or, no better, a backlash against free-market reform." Id.
9. Post-Revolutionary Russian system refers to the period after the Revolution of 1991.
10. See To Whom Belongs Power in Russia?, supra note 4, at 1, 5; Money Talks, supra note 8, at 10. STEPHEN HANDLEMAN, COMRADE CRiMINAL 55-56 (1995) . The Author notes that criminality "was at the heart of the Soviet system .... The huge profits that Not only does the Mafiya 11 kill and steal in Russia, it does so in the United States as well.
1 2 The Russian Mafiya is increasingly engaged in crime in the West. 1 Mafiya members are involved in "theft, extortion, money-laundering, 4 gun-trafficking, drug running, prostitution, smuggling, loan sharking, contract killing and more."' 5 The U.S. Department ofJustice ("DOJ") has established task forces to deal with the Russian Mafiya in New York, Los Angeles, and Miami. Thus, U.S. businesses that pay bribes and protection money in Russia may be unwittingly financing Russian criminal activity back in the United States.
1 6 As one commentator notes, businessmen:
[W]ho pay protection money to the Russian Mafia are helping to cement anarchy for years to come and prevent the establishment of the rule of law in Russia. And those who hope that their compromises will in the long run promote the penetration of a less corrupt "Western Culture" are lying to themselves. If Russia recovers, it will be despite and not because of the Mafia, despite and not because of passive collaboration by 17 foreign businessmen.'.
Clearly, it is not in the best interests of the United States for Russia to become a criminal oligarchy. Following the demolition the crime lords began to earn in the black market could only have been possible with the tacit approval, if not the open cooperation, of government authorities and police." Id. 11. See Stephen Handelman, The Russian Mafiya, FOR. AFF., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 2. "Mafiya" is the transliteration from Russian. Id. As discussed below, the Russian Mafiya is different from the Sicilian mafia. Id. The two terms should be differentiated; thus the difference in spelling. Id. 12. Allan Friedman, The Organizatsiya: Brooklyn's Booming Russian Mob is Slicker, Smarter, and Much Meaner than La Cosa Nostra, N.Y. MAO., Nov. 7, 1994, at 50.
Just a few years ago, the FBI denied there even was a Russian mob. But five months ago, in the wake of at least fifteen gang-hit murders in Brighton Beach and evidence of a burgeoning alliance between Russian gangsters and the Italian Mafia, the FBI set up an elite squad to combat what experts say is the most important organized crime wave of the nineties .... The Russian mob... has more than 300 members in the New York area alone, making it larger than the Bonanno, Colombo, or Lucchese crime families.
Id. of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers were euphoric about a potential future partnership between the United States and other Western democracies and a new democratic Russia. In some ways this type of partnership has emerged, but it has not been free of problems. The initial euphoria has been tempered by the sobering facts of reality. Optimism has surrendered to pessimism as the reality of Russia's difficult transition from a command government, economy, and society to a liberal government, economy, and society has presented Russia and the World with enormous and difficult challenges. It is now apparent that a major hurdle for Russia on the road to democracy is the issue of crime and official corruption. Recent visits to Russia by U.S. law enforcement officials have made it clear that the U.S. Government is concerned about crime and corruption in Russia.' 8 The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), Louis Freeh, has said that the growth of organized crime in Russia and Eastern Europe is a "threat to the integrity of government." 9 The Russian people have also expressed their deep concern about crime and its negative impact upon reform in Russia. President Boris Yeltsin 2° has expressed concern about Mafiya influence in government and has said that "organized crime is persistently trying to gain access to Big Politics and the machinery of state.""
Daniel Kiaidman, How To Police an Ex-Police
The success of Russian democracy represents a fundamental pillar of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Government spends millions of U.S. tax dollars to promote democratic and market, economic reforms in Russia. Meanwhile, U.S. businesses and businessmen who pay bribes to Russian government officials may be unwitting supporters of organized crime in Russia. More impor-
Lee Hockstader, Moscow Insists Criminals Can't Get at Nuclear Weapons, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., July 1, 1994, at 2. Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") visited Russia "to focus attention on increased threats from international crime groups, terrorism and drug trafficking." Id. Director Freeh had previously testified before Congress that the FBI was concerned that nuclear materials from Russia could find their way into the hands of organized crime or terrorist groups in the West and that this constitutes "the greatest long term threat to the security of the United States." Id.
19 The current Administration in Washington is searching for means to combat the rise of crime and criminal elements in Russia. 2 3 Indeed, it is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and the key to the post-Cold War era that democracy take root and flour--ish in Russia. Much effort is being made by the United States and other democratic nations to assist Russia in its metamorphosis from a corrupt totalitarian regime to a popular democracy. These nations should, therefore, not tolerate support of corrupt officials and organizations by private businesses in direct contra.-diction to this policy.
The United States currently has the means to combat the payment of bribes by U.S. citizens to corrupt Russian Government officials through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") .24 Unfortunately, U.S. officials have failed to vigorously enforce this legal mechanism vis-it-vis corrupt practices in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
The FCPA prohibits the payment of bribes or other illicit payments to government officials. 2 " Congress enacted the law to prohibit the payment of bribes to foreign government officials and to prevent any adverse effects such illicit payments would and could have on U.S. foreign policy, foreign governments, and U.S. businesses operating abroad. 2 6
The U.S. business community in Russia should be aware Only by doing so will they avoid what may prove to be crushing losses to their economic and business interests in the future. 8 The current "Wild East" 29 atmosphere in Russia, hopefully, will not endure. As Russia moves toward the establishment of democratic rule and a market economy, it is highly unlikely that rampant bribery of government officials will continue to be tolerated or that past illegal conduct will be easily forgiven. Enforcement and punishment of such practices will begins 0 and U.S. businesses that do not rectify their conduct in accordance with FCPA may encounter severe problems in the future.
III. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RISE OF THE MAF1YA
With the fall of the Soviet Union and rise of market reforms in Russia, a then-existing group consisting of corrupt criminal officials, ex-black-marketeers, and common criminals took advantage of the lack of commercial regulation and crumbling police power to prey on the nascent commercial enterprises of the resurrected Russia. The virtually unregulated market in Russia has created a wealth of opportunities for criminal organizations, from the shake-down of small kiosk operators for protection money 3 6 to the peddling of stolen nuclear fuel on the international market." Official corruption is rampant. In 1995, criminal proceedings were instituted against two-thousand employees of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 3 8
IV. DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN RUSSIA:
THREATENED BY CRIME ") ). Among the services provided by organized crime in Russia are: [S] ecurity in the form of protection for individuals and property, arbitration in the form of settling disputes, or seeing that business contracts are honored, financial assistance in the form of loans, often at lower rates than banks, and even some social services such as assistance to the needy through criminally owned philanthropic organizations.
Id.
42. Hockstader, supra note 18, at 2. Law and order were the primary reasons people voted for Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December 1993 parliamentary elections in Russia. Id. Yeltsin issued a decree that took effect in June 1993 allowing the police to hold a suspect for up to 30 days without bringing charges and giving police expanded powers to search homes and offices. Id.
43. See Mafia Rules Russia: CIA, supra note 41, at 4. CIA Director Woolsey notes that the implications of organized crime influence in Russia and its negative impact on democratic reforms are "enormous." Handelman, supra note 11, at 88 (noting that Russian authorities readily acknowledge that mixture of unbridled capitalism, organized crime, and official chicanery has produced crisis of governance).
44. Mafia Rules Russia: CIA, supra note 41, at 4. 45. See Open Letter, KOMSOMLSKAYA PRAVDA, July 17, 1994, at 1 (noting that "killings occur when banks refuse to pay the mafia either protection money or loans .... Violence has become a means of intimidating bankers and the ministry and the prosecu-by organized crime groups. 46 To combat this wave of terrorism against bankers, in 1994 the Association of Russian Bankers hired as its director a former Russian Interior Ministry official who is spearheading lobbying efforts to convince the Government to provide better protection for banks and bankers against crime. 47 U.S. businessmen have also been threatened with violence by criminal groups. 48 Moreover, the crime wave in Russia has, indirectly, already had a strongly negative impact on democratic reforms. 49 Russians have become disheartened with democratic reform, and have begun to equate democracy with lawlessness and a sharp decrease in personal safety and well-being.
In an effort to combat rising crime and corruption within the Government, President Boris Yeltsin promulgated a stringent decree to fight crime that grants the police the right to detain a criminal suspect for up to thirty days before bringing formal charges. 5° Ironically, many view this decree as a blow to democratic reform in Russia. 1 The Russian Duma 2 passing a resolution by 279 votes to 10, held that Yeltsin's decree "restricts the constitutional rights and citizen's freedom without sufficient basis." 52. The "Russian State Duma," ("Duma") referred to in this Essay is the lower house of the Russian national legislature, a body that is roughly equivalent in size to the U.S. House of Representatives.
53. Thomas deWaal, Crime Decree Flouts Law, Duma Charges, Moscow TIMES, June 23, 1994, at 3. Many members of the Duma were concerned that the decree could be used against them by the executive branch. Id.
[Vol. 19:1999 bill currently pending in the Duma, "would set up special courts of three professional judges to rule on matters involving organized crime, require that banks report on any suspicious activity by their clients and give law enforcers the power to provoke suspects into criminal actions." 5 4 Liberals in the Duma have criticized this bill, arguing "that the special courts would barely differ from the notorious troikas set up by Joseph Stalin to persecute political opponents without a proper trial." 55 Such undemocratic tendencies in the Russian Government are being fueled by official corruption and crime. Since most Russian government officials gained their experience in the totalitarian Soviet regime, the solutions they formulate in response to crime and corruption often draw on this "totalitarian" experience. Democratic principles of restraint are often overlooked. Indeed, it is difficult not to doubt the sincerity of the anti-crime political rhetoric when many of these same officials are "profiting from the legal chaos of New Russia." 5 6
V. CRIME IN RUSSIA
Crime and its impact on the development of democracy is the primary concern of many Russian politicians. As mentioned above, President Boris Yeltsin has taken strong measures against crime in his anti-crime decree, even as the Law has alarmed defenders of individual and human rights in the Russian Duma.
57
Still other members of the Russian legislature have expressed concern that Russia will become a criminalized society if economic reform is not pushed through the Russian Duma and corrupt influences are not eliminated from government.
58
Russian politicians themselves have not been immune from the crime wave gripping Russia. A Communist member of the Duma died on November 5, 1994, from head injuries sustained in an attack near the entrance to his home in Moscow four days earlier. 59 The Communist Party issued a statement stating that: The tragic death of our comrade is not a coincidence -it is a direct result of the outburst of crime, lawlessness and chaos in society which has occurred because of the loss of governance in the country, and the paralysis of its structures of authority. 60 In April 1994, another Russian Member of Parliament ("MP") 6 1 was gunned down in front of his home on the outskirts of Moscow in a gang-style shooting. 6 2 In commenting on this incident, members of the Duma have expressed their-displeasure with having to serve alongside other members of the Duma who are connected, or believed to be connected, to organized crime groups.6 In fact, Mafiya leaders actually encourage criminals to seek seats in the Duma because of the broad immunity conferred on those elected to the Russian parliament, 6 4 and it is a well-known fact that a number of individuals have run for office solely to avoid prison sentences. 6 5 One operator who established a large pyramid scheme to bilk thousands of Russians out of millions of dollars actually avoided detention by successfully running for a seat in the Duma. 6 6 Following the December 1995 Duma elections, the Russian Central Election Commission noted that over seventy of the registered candidates seeking election have criminal records or criminal charges pending against them. 6 7 President Yeltsin even informed regional leaders at the time that "some candidates had already come under pressure to drop out of December's [1995] election to boost the chances of 60. Id. It is conceivable that the Communist Party sees crime as a possible vehicle to assist its return to power, a development that would severely threaten democracy in Russia.
61. "MP," or member of parliament, is the acronym used in this Essay to refer to a member of the Russian Duma.
62. Pyotr Yudin, Motive for Murder Unknown, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at 1. 63. In a meeting with members of the Russian Duma, I was told that there was concern that criminal elements were buying seats on party lists and elections with funds procured from Russian banks, widely believed to be controlled by organized crime and corrupt Government officials.
64 Top government officials have admitted that the Russian bureaucracy and police organizations have joined with organized crime to become the chief antagonist of independent businessmen. 7 1 As one observer notes, "the unofficial alliance between [Russian] officialdom and criminal syndicates is no secret." 7 2 Russian businessmen are afraid to register their companies with local governments for fear of having their financial information passed on to criminal groups who will then use the information to extort money from them. 75 
A. The Mafiya
It is important to clarify the point referred to above that the Russian Mafiya differs from the Italian mafia as the latter has been portrayed in "The Godfather" and other movies. In some respects, the Russian Mafiya is even more frightening because it represents a virtual, if not actual, partnership between government officials and criminals. 74 Many believe that this corrupt influence reaches to the highest levels of the Russian Government, 75 out the Soviet era, the Communist Party was largely seen as the most powerful of all criminal organizations. 77 The Party controlled not just one aspect of an illicit economy but the entirety of a nation and its resources. 78 The Russian Mafiya also represents an attitude, not merely an organization. This attitude, developed during the years of Communist Party rule, is rooted in the belief, held by many government officials to this day, that if something is not nailed down, or placed within their power, they can treat it as their own property. 79 These former Communist apparachiks are not adverse to taking, selling, or auctioning off to the highest bidder any thing or authority entrusted to them. In some instances, businessmen have "rented" government-owned airplanes to transport goods. 80 Such incidents only came to light after the rented planes were overloaded with cargo and subsequently crashed."' In addition, corrupt former Communist, now Russian, officials have sold secret military hardware to the United States, 82 indicating that if the price is right, even treason is not an impediment to a lucrative deal. 83 One must not be mislead by the attitude held by a large number of Russians that anyone who engages in commercial ac- 78. Id. at 183. The Communist Party apparatus was the most gigantic mafia the world has ever known. It guarded its monopoly on power with a sham consensus and constitution and backed it up with the force of the KGB and the Interior Ministry police. There were also handsome profits. The Party had so obviously socked away money abroad and sold off national resources, including the country's vast gold reserves, that after the collapse of the August coup, the Party's leading financial officer took a look into the future and threw himself off a high balcony to his death.
Id.
79 [Vol. 19:1999 tivity, who buys and sells, or who is from the Caucasus region, 8 4 is a member of the Mafiya. As one observer notes, during the communist era, the term "mafiya" "became the mutter of explanation for every shortage and inequity, and only foreigners made the mistake of thinking the term referred exclusively to the hustlers at the bottom of the criminal structure." 85 Mafiya means many things to many people, especially Russians, but when the term is defined as government corruption and organized crime it is a real, current, and dangerous Russian problem.
B. The Mafiya and the Russian Government
During the Soviet era, the Mafiya and government officials formed partnerships that controlled the lucrative "black" and "grey" markets of the Soviet Union. 6 
C. The Russian Mafiya in the United States
The Russian Mafiya has been operating in the United States for years. 9 5 With the fall of the Soviet Union, the activities of Russian organized crime groups have spread in the United States and Europe and it is possible that such groups possess the capability to steal nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials.
9 6 Recently, several professional Russian hockey players in the United States have complained of being shaken down by Russian Mafiya members who demand money in exchange for protecting the players' families. 9 7 Moreover, smuggled Russian commodities have negatively impacted the world commodities markets, 9 8 as a result of which five-thousand U.S. smelter jobs were lost in 1994.11 Presently, the U.S. and Russian Governments are cooperating in efforts to combat criminals operating in the United States and Russia. 10°T he FBI has assigned agents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, while U.S. Department of Justice prosecutors currently reside in Moscow. Presumably, these individuals will continue to seek and enforce effective measures to combat crime "imported" from 91. Handelman, supra note 11, at 84. Russian organized crime groups demonstrate little concern for innocent bystanders, evidenced by the fact that a number of innocent bystanders have been killed by bombs intended for businessmen. Id. 107. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 238 .
Sonny Efron, Russian Farmer's Road to Market Runs Afoul of Chaotic Distribution
and Organized Criminals, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1994, at 12. Tatyana Vasilyeva, President of the local Krasnodar branch of the Association of Russian Pheasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives ("AKKOR"), which represents 16,680 private farmers, commented that "[it is really scary, but despite the fact that the markets are empty, it's still impossible to sell your produce in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large Russian cities." Id. She also noted that:
[H]ighway robbers, traffic police who demand payola in exchange for free passage and pay offs to local gangsters make a mockery of a free market ....
[F]armers were stopped at the outskirts of the city, where racketeers together with corrupt traffic police insisted that the contents of the truck be handed over at rock-bottom prices. Id. Much of this "criminal" problem is also due to the crushing Russian regulations and taxation that drives even legitimate businessmen underground. See U.S. Business and the
VII. AMERICAN BUSINESSES IN RUSSIA
A now standard remark among Americans in Moscow is that the United States won the Cold War. Evidence of this may be seen on virtually every block in the center of Moscow. Advertisements for U.S. soft drinks, candy, cigarettes, and other products decorate virtually every kiosk in the city. Panel vans roll by the Kremlin advertising U.S. air conditioning and heating, construction, and oil companies. The presence of U.S. business in Russia is undeniable. As one of the last great markets in the World slowly opens up, U.S. businesses and businessmen will continue to work and do business in Russia. Along with the sizable and lucrative opportunities that the Russian market represents, however, a business presence in Russia is accompanied by a number of risks and pitfalls.
It is estimated that twenty percent of all foreigners engaged in business in St. Petersburg currently pay protection money to the Russian Mafiya.' 0 In 1994, U.S. companies and individuals doing business in Russia became a target of Russian criminals. 1°U .S. firms have been forced to pay protection money, expend large sums on security, or leave the Country altogether. 11 Such additional burdens of doing business in Russia may, in time, compel U.S. businesses to choose between leaving the Russian market or violating U.S. law if bribe-paying to Russian government officials continues to be an unavoidable consequence of doing business in the region.
Already, it is well-known that bribing government officials has become a method of doing business for some U.S. businesses operating in Russia,"' despite the fact that such acts are illegal under both Russian and U.S. law. Indeed, many individuals and companies who pay bribes do so knowing full well that they risk payment of substantial fines or loss of personal freedom should their activities amount to criminal behavior under either legal regime.
Russian Mob, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at Cl. A U.S. lawyer who is working in Russia has said that "official corruption, an irrational system of levying taxes, and a lasting mistrust of profit still hurt American businesses far more than crime does." Id.
109 119. The OECD was created pursuant to treaty between its member countries. The OECD Treaty came into force on September 30, 1961. Its member countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zea-' land, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and out corruption and bribery of government officials in international commercial transactions. 120 The new code "represents a commitment to effective measures based upon agreement that corruption is both harmful to fair competition and to the political process." 1 2 1 It is doubtful, however, if this code will be adopted by other industrial nations without strong leadership and persistent prodding from the United States.
In response to complaints from U.S. businesses along the lines discussed above, the U.S. Congress amended the FCPA in 1988.122 The amendments narrowed the "knowledge" requirement of illicit payments by third persons, set forth in the statute. U.S. businesses may now be liable under the FCPA for payments made by third persons to foreign government officials only if the business has a "firm belief" that the illegal payments will be made by the third person, or that such payments are likely to occur. 23 The amendments also permitted certain types of pay- ments. "Grease" payments, or payments made to facilitate or expedite the performance of a routine government action, were exempted from prosecution under the FCPA.1 24 One example of a grease payment would be paying a customs official to perform his or her routine duties in a timely fashion. In addition, a business may raise an affirmative defense if the payment made was legal under the laws of the official's country. 125 Moreover, reasonable incurred costs such as travel and lodging to demonstrate a product or perform a contract with a foreign government are permissible under the amendments. This situation may change, however, with the adoption of a foreign-corrupt-practices-type act by the OECD. l2 . The OECD code would require that all industrialized nations prohibit bribery of foreign government officials. 124. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b)-2(b) (1994). "Routine governmental action" is defined as an action that is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign governmental official in: i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a country;
ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; iii)providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections related to the transit of goods across country; iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or v) actions of similar nature. Id. § 78dd-1 (f) (3) (A).
"Routine governmental action" is not:
[Any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party. Id.  § 78dd-1 (f) (3) (B) . HAVING REGARD to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which exhort enterprises to refrain from bribery of public servants and holders of public office in their operations;
CONSIDERING that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business transactions, including trade and investment, raising serious moral and political concerns and distorting international competitive conditions;
RECOGNIZING that all OECD Member countries have legislation that makes the bribing of their public officials and taking of bribes by these officials a criminal offense while only a few Member countries have specific laws making the bribing of foreign officials a punishable offense;
CONVINCED that further action is needed on both the national and international level to dissuade both enterprises and public officials from resorting to bribery when negotiating international business transactions and that an OECD initiative in this area could act as a catalyst for global action;
CONSIDERING that such action should take fully into account the differences that exist in jurisdictional and other legal principles and practices in this area;
CONSIDERING that a review of the mechanisms would assist Member countries in implementing this recommendation and in evaluating the steps taken and the results achieved;
On the proposal of the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises; GENERAL I. RECOMMENDS that Member countries take effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connection with international business transactions. II. CONSIDERS that, for the purposes of this Recommendation, bribery can involve the direct or indirect offer or provision of any undue pecuniary or other advantage to or for a foreign public official, in violation of the official's legal duties, in order to obtain or retain business [The notion of bribery in some countries also includes advantages to or for members of a law-making body, candidates for a law-making body or public office and officials of political parties.]
DOMESTIC ACrION
Ill. RECOMMENDS that each Member country examine the following areas and, in conformity with its jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, take concrete and meaningful steps to meet this goal. These steps may include: i) criminal laws, or their application, in respect of the bribery of foreign public officials;
ii) civil, commercial, administrative laws and regulations so that bribery would be illegal;
iii) tax legislation, regulations and practices, insofar as they may indirectly favour bribery; iv) company and business accounting requirements and practices in order to secure adequate recording of relevant payments; v) banking, financial and other relevant provisions so that adequate records would be kept and made available for inspection or investigation; and vi) laws and regulations relating to public subsidies, licenses, government of their own officials, only the United States prohibits the bribery of foreign government officials. 13 0 The FCPA prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign offiprocurement contracts, or other public advantages so that advantages could be denied as a sanction for bribery in appropriate cases.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IV. RECOMMENDS that Member countries in order to combat bribery in international transactions, in conformity with their jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, take the following actions: i) consult and otherwise cooperate with appropriate authorities in other countries in investigations and other legal proceedings concerning specific cases of such bribery through such means as sharing of information (spontaneous or "upon request"), provision of evidence, and extradition;
ii) make full use of existing agreements and arrangements for mutual international legal assistance and where necessary, enter into new agreements or arrangements for this purpose;
iii) ensure that their national laws afford an adequate basis for this cooperation.
REGULATIONS WITH NON-MEMBERS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
V. APPEALs to non-Member countries to join the OECD in combating bribery in international business transactions and to take full account of the terms of this recommendation. VI REQUESTS the Secretariat to consult with international organizations and international financial institutions on effective means to combat bribery as an aid to promote the policy of good governance. VII. INVIrEs Member countries to promote anti-corruption policies within and beyond the OECD area and, in their dealings with non-Member countries, to encourage them to join in the effort to combat such bribery in accordance with this recommendation.
FOLLOW-UP PROCEDURES
VIII INSTRUCTS the Committee on International Investment and multinational Enterprises to monitor implementation and follow-up of this recommendation. For this purpose, the Committee is invited to establish a Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions and in particular: i) to carry out regular reviews of steps taken by Member countries to implement this Recommendation, and to make proposals appropriate to assist members in its implementation;
ii) to examine specific issues relating to bribery in international business transactions;
iii) to provide a forum for consultations; iv) to explore the possibility of associating non-Members with this work; and v) in close cooperation with the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, to examine the fiscal treatment of bribery, including the issue of tax deductibility of bribes. IX. INSTRUCTS the Committee to report to the Council after the first regular review and as appropriate thereafter, and to review this Recommendation within three years after its adoption. OECD Press Release SG/Press (94) (36). Attachment dated Paris, 27th May 1994.
130. Code on Corruption Advanced, supra note 118, at A13. cials to secure business advantages, and requires U.S. companies to maintain stringent accounting standards so as to prelude the establishment of "slush funds" to provide funds for such illicit payments. ' The FCPA specifically prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign officials for the purpose of influencing any official decision, omission, or act by that official in violation of the official duty of that foreign official to enable a U.S. business to obtain or maintain business in that foreign land.
13 2 Payments to a third party for the purposes of paying a bribe to a foreign official are also prohibited if the payor has knowledge of the illicit nature of the payment. 3 The FCPA pertains to all U.S. businesses1 3 4 and to any employee, agent, director, official, or stockholder who acts on behalf of an issuer of securities or domestic concern in violation of the Act.
135
The U.S. DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") are jointly responsible for enforcing the FCPA. The SEC handles civil actions pertaining to the enforcement of accounting procedures and civil violations of the FCPA by issuers of securities." 6 The DOJ handles all criminal proceedings under the FCPA, as well as civil proceedings that do not pertain to issuers of securities.1 3 7 , The 1988 amendments to the Act empowered the U.S. Attorney General to provide guidelines to U.S. ions on the legality of contemplated payments by U.S. businesses to foreign officials. ' o An opinion issued by the Attorney General creates a rebuttable presumption that the payment made was legal under the Act.' 4 0 The joint responsibility of the DOJ and SEC has created a bureaucratic rivalry that has adversely impacted enforcement of the Act. Thus far, the two agencies have demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate in FCPA investigations."' In addition, a plea agreement obtained by the DOJ does not necessarily preclude an action by the SEC. 142 In the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, Congress increased the penalties for violating the Act, imposing a maximum US$10,000 civil fine for violations;' 4 3 a maximum criminal penalty for individuals of US$100,000; 1 ' 4 4 and a maximum criminal fine for U.S. corporations of US$2 million. 43 The Those instances of successful prosecution under the FCPA have arisen when foreign governments have cooperated in the investigation of acts of corruption in their own countries. 15° The current administration in Russia has expressed its desire to root out corruption in government, although some legislators and exmembers of the Yeltsin Administration have claimed this is not the case.
15 ' Nevertheless, a change in leadership in Russia in the next few years could pave the way for vigorous enforcement of the FCPA 5 2 If a new Russian administration were to make combating official corruption a priority, cooperation with the United States on FCPA investigations would be an effective means of striking at, and severely curtailing, sources of bribe money. 1 53 Clearly, by working together, the Russian and U.S. governments could apply the FCPA to root out and punish corrupt Russian government officials and U.S. businessmen who are making illicit payments to facilitate business deals. The two governments may already be working on such a cooperative eff6rt.1' 5 Thus, U.S. businesses should beware. U.S. businesses should exert all possible efforts to ensure compliance with the FCPA to prevent future legal problems.
X. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS
Whatever harm the FCPA may inflict upon U.S. business competitiveness in Russia, the Act is a method by which the Government may restrain U.S. businesses from undermining U.S. foreign policy interests. 155 In the case of Russia, the United States has spent billions of dollars in foreign aid to promote the development of democracy and a market economy in Russia. If U.S. businesses were permitted to bribe Russian officials and become part of the corrupting influences on the nascent Russian democratic Government, this would be, at the least, harmful and possibly fatal, to the goals of U.S. foreign policy.' 5 6 If the U.S. Government is serious about the establishment of democracy in Russia, it should take full and vigorous measures to prevent the bribery of Russian officials by U.S. citizens. One such measure should be the creation of a reporting mechanism between the U.S. and Russian governments that would enable U.S. businesses to report requests for bribes by Russian government officials.' 5 7 There should also be increased cooperation between U.S. and Russian law enforcement officials on criminal matters, specifically with respect to bribery. To protect their interests in Russia, the U.S. business community should: 1) ensure that they exercise adequate controls over the activities of their representatives in Russia; 2) pressure the U.S. Government to create, through diplomatic channels, a mechanism by which requests for bribes by Russian officials and dishonest activity by government officials may be submitted to the Russian Government for prosecution; 3) pressure the Russian Government to enact more effective anti-bribery legislation; and 4) pressure Congress to grant a private right of action under the FCPA, in order to make the anti-bribery laws more "self-policing" within the business community. Because of the handicap imposed on U.S. businesses by U.S. laws such as the FCPA, the U.S. Government must be ready and willing to support and assist U.S. businesses abroad in their efforts to penetrate developing markets such as Russia.
XII. RECOMMENDATIONS ON GOVERNMENT ACTION
The FCPA should be amended to provide for a private right of action. 162 Furthermore, jurisdiction in such private actions should be extended to foreign nationals, partnerships, corporations, and organizations who do business in the United States and who engage in bribery or other prohibited acts under the FCPA that adversely affects the business interests of U.S. citizens, partnerships, or corporations doing business abroad or of non-U.S. citizens, partnerships, or corporations doing business in the United States. Such an extension of U.S. jurisdiction would almost certainly raise protests from abroad. If the United States is serious about ending bribery of foreign government officials, however, it must take stronger action to persuade other industrialized countries to provide a means by which their citizens may take similar action. Permitting a private right of action and extended jurisdiction will certainly send this message to governments around the World. The U.S. economy and U.S. businesses have become increasingly international and the U.S. Government must take a leading role in any effort to eradicate official corruption and bribery whose sole aim is pecuniary gain.
One of the main criticisms of the FCPA is that it places U.S. 163. Nonetheless, at the least, OECD Member Nations realize that the domestic laws of each Member Nation should emphasize combatting bribery of foreign government officials. Such action by the United States may be the catalyst required to induce other nations to prohibit bribery of foreign government officials by nationals, as well as favorable tax treatment in exchange for bribes under existing domestic laws.
would provide leverage in U.S. and OECD efforts to achieve agreement among the World's established democracies to combat bribery of government officials and high-level corruption in the governments of their trading partners. Making businesses and businessmen in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere liable under U.S. law for illicit payments to foreign government officials will, at a minimum, create a dialogue on bribery and corruption among the World's democratic trading nations. As noted above, virtually every nation prohibits bribery of domestic government officials. Moreover, no nation condones briber as a concept, and the United States must take the leadership role in unifying world public opinion in opposition to bribery of foreign government officials as well.
CONCLUSION
Change has been a constant in virtually all phases of Russian life in the past ten years. Chances are that this atmosphere will continue for another decade. 1 64 U.S. businesses and businessmen should expect and, indeed, hope that the Russian legal system becomes more predictable and efficient. U.S. businesses should also expect continued cooperation between the U.S. and Russian governments. Ultimately, such cooperation, accompanied by more effective enforcement of U.S. laws, could force U.S. businesses to incur substantial fines as a result of corporate liability under U.S. law if they do not take precautions to ensure full compliance with the FCPA when conducting business in Russia. 165. Lockheed Pleads Guilty to Bribery Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1995, at Cl.
The Lockheed Corporation agreed to pay a.US$24.8 million fine after pleading guilty to conspiring to bribe an Egyptian politician and to falsifying its financial records. The article pointed out that:
Federal Prosecutors said that if the criminal case had gone to trial, they would have shown that Lockheed conspired to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by paying an Egyptian legislator $1 million for her help in securing an Egyptian government contract for three C-130H cargo jets worth $79 million.
